

APPENDIX

Estimation of the Electorate of Immigrant Origin

To estimate the share of the electorate of immigrant origin, data on the foreign-born population (e.g., United Nations Population Division 2008; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010) are not suited because they do not take into account that many immigrants do not have voting rights. The share of immigrants with voting rights varies strongly across countries and over time due to differential naturalization rates and postcolonial migration. Alternatively, one could subtract the foreign (i.e., noncitizen) population (e.g., Migration Information Source 2010) from the foreign-born population to obtain an estimate of the first-generation immigrant population with voting rights. Although this measure has the advantage of simplicity, it contains three important inaccuracies that distort cross-national comparison. First, it is biased by the fact that in countries with restrictive nationality acquisition, a substantial part of those with foreign citizenship are not foreign-born immigrants but belong to the second generation of children of immigrants born in the country of immigration. Second, the measure does not take into account that foreign citizens may have voting rights. In the Scandinavian countries, foreign citizens have had voting rights on the local level since the beginning of our period of study, and the same has been true for the Netherlands since 1985. With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, citizens of EU countries residing in another member state received local voting rights. In the United Kingdom, citizens of Commonwealth countries and of the Republic of Ireland have voting rights on all levels of the polity. Third, while in a strict sense one might argue that all foreign-born are immigrants, some belong to the same ethnic group as the majority population of the country of immigration. Especially in the case of countries that lost territories through defeat in the Second World War (Germany) or through decolonization (France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands), substantial numbers of foreign-born people are coethnics of the majority population who arrived with full citizenship rights and no claims to cultural difference. We prefer to exclude these coethnic migrants from our measure because they are not likely to exert the same kind of electoral pressure toward extending immigrant rights as will immigrant voters who belong to different ethnic and religious groups than the majority population. Coethnic migrants tend to be affiliated with the political right, for example, the “Aussiedler” from eastern Europe in Germany or the “pieds noirs” from Algeria in France (Wüst 2003; Comtat 2009).

We therefore calculated a more complex measure that takes into account these factors and also includes the second-generation offspring of immigrants. As a first step, we calculated for each of our measurement points the cumulative number of persons naturalized since 1970 based on a variety of data sources (Lederer 1997; Janoski 2010; Migration Information Source 2010; OECD 2010). Using Janoski’s (2010) estimates, we included jus soli acquisitions of nationality by the second generation in France and the United Kingdom. We further adjusted these figures for the three countries—France, the Netherlands,¹⁵ and the United Kingdom—where immigrants from former or remaining colonies held citizenship upon arrival or, in the case of the United Kingdom, have national-level voting rights even if they do not have the British nationality. For the Netherlands, we used data provided by Nicolaas and Sprangers (2007) and added for each measurement year the numbers of persons who were either born in Surinam and the Dutch Antilles or had at least one parent born there. We did not add all persons born in Indonesia because a substantial part of these immigrants were ethnic Dutch, who returned to the Netherlands after

¹⁵ The native inhabitants of the former Belgian Congo have never had a claim to Belgian citizenship.

Indonesian independence. However, another part of the Indonesian foreign-born consists of ethnic Indonesians and people of mixed race. Precise estimates of the relative sizes of these two groups are not available, and we therefore added 50% of the Indonesian foreign-born and their children to our estimate of immigrants with voting rights. For France, we added the 91,000 Harki-Algerian Muslims who served in the French colonial army—who came to France between 1962 and 1968 as well as, based on data provided by INSEE (2002), all persons born in the so-called DOM TOM (Départements et Territoires d’Outre Mer, i.e., the remnants of the French colonial empire; e.g., Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guyana, Reunion, and New Caledonia). We obtained an estimate of the second generation for these groups by adding the percentage of foreign-born 20 years prior to the current number of foreign-born from these groups, that is, assuming that a generation later, the first generation would have exactly reproduced itself. This method seems adequate because according to estimates by Solis Conseil (2009), there were, in 2009, 757,000 persons of DOM TOM origin in metropolitan France, which is indeed about twice the number of first-generation persons born in the DOM TOM according to the 1999 census (356,834). For the United Kingdom, we added all persons born in a Commonwealth country or in the Republic of Ireland, who all have voting rights, regardless of nationality status. We do not need to further include the second generation from these groups because they are already included in our naturalization figures because of jus soli acquisition.¹⁶

The figures thus obtained were divided by the total population of the country minus the foreign population to obtain the final estimate of immigrants with national voting rights as a share of the total electorate. Ideally, we would of course need to calculate both immigrants with voting rights and the total electorate on the basis of the population of 18-year-olds and older, but because of data limitations, it is impossible to calculate such age-specific data. Because the share of under-18-year-olds is higher among immigrants, this implies that we somewhat overestimate the share of immigrant voters, but we can assume that this bias is roughly stable across time and across countries.

This, however, does not yet take into account local voting rights for foreign citizens. For those cases with local voting rights for all foreigners (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, as well as the Netherlands from 1990 onward), we added the percentage of foreigners of all nationalities to the share of immigrants with national voting rights to obtain the share of immigrants with local voting rights. For EU countries with local voting rights for EU citizens only, we added the percentage of foreigners from EU countries (calculated on the basis of Eurostat 2010) to obtain the share of immigrants with local voting rights.¹⁷

Table A1 gives the resulting percentage shares of the electorate of immigrant origin for the national and local polity levels for each country and measurement year.

¹⁶ This procedure is only approximately accurate because some of the Commonwealth born will have naturalized and are therefore already included in our cumulative naturalization figures. However, against this, there are no data available on the second-generation offspring of people of non-British descent who came to Britain in the decolonization period carrying full British citizenship, because they acquired British citizenship neither by regular naturalization nor by jus soli, but simply by being born to a UK citizen. We assume that these two biases roughly cancel each other out. We found data on the origin countries of the foreign-born population only for 2001 (Migration Information Source 2010). In that year, 55% of the foreign-born originated in a Commonwealth country. Assuming that the share of the Commonwealth born among all foreign-born has been roughly stable over time, we used this percentage to calculate estimates of the Commonwealth-born population by multiplying the foreign-born population for each measurement year by a factor of .55.

¹⁷ Subtracting the UK Irish nationals, who are already included in the percentage of immigrants with national voting rights.

TABLE A1
 Estimates of the Share of Voters of First-or Second-Generation Immigrant
 Origin among the National and Local Electorates in 10 Countries, 1980–2008

	1980		1990		2002		2008	
	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local
Austria9	.9	2.0	2.0	4.9	8.3	7.4	11.3
Belgium7	.7	2.2	2.2	6.1	11.7	8.1	14.3
Denmark7	2.6	1.4	4.3	2.0	6.9	3.2	9.0
France	2.5	2.5	4.8	4.8	7.3	9.2	9.9	11.9
Germany2	.2	.5	.5	1.8	4.9	2.8	5.7
Netherlands	2.5	2.5	4.8	9.1	9.5	13.8	10.3	14.7
Norway4	2.3	1.1	4.4	3.4	7.8	5.1	11.5
Sweden	2.2	7.3	4.5	10.1	9.1	14.4	11.4	17.5
Switzerland	3.0	3.0	5.2	5.2	8.6	8.6	11.9	11.9
United Kingdom ...	2.1	2.1	4.3	4.3	6.7	8.3	10.2	12.6