

Preliminary Program of the Conference on

**Matching Market Design:
Strategy-Proofness and Beyond**

July 13–14, 2023

Hosted and organized by the WZB Berlin Social Science Center

The conference is supported by grants from the
CRC TRR 190, BSE Insights, and the BCCP


Organizers:

Christian Basteck

Dorothea Kübler

Vincent Meisner (TU)

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)



Thursday, July 13, 2023

9.00–9.30 **Registration**
Workshop Opening

9.30–10.40 **1st Session: Chair: tba**

Alex Rees-Jones (University of Pennsylvania)

[Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review](#)

Camille Terrier (Queen Mary University of London):

[From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England](#)

10.40–11.45 Coffee Break

11.05–12.15 **2nd Session Chair: tba**

Markus Möller (University of Bonn):

[Transparent Matching Mechanisms](#)

Yannai Gonczarowski (Harvard University):

[Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms](#)

12.15–13.00 Lunch Break

13.00–14.10 **3rd Session Chair: tba**


Bnaya Dreyfus (Harvard University) or **Ofer Glicksohn**
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem):

[Deferred Acceptance with News Utility](#)

Peter Katuscak (RWTH Aachen University):

“Do People Misreport in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms to Avoid Disappointment?”

14.10–14.35 Coffee Break



14.35–16.20 4th Session Chair: tba

Yuki Tamura (NYU Abu Dhabi):

“A Characterization of Obviously Strategy-proof Rules for Object Reallocation Problems with Single-peaked Preferences”

Clayton Thomas (Princeton University):

[Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions](#)

Ori Heffetz (Princeton University):

“Explaining Deferred Acceptance to Participants: Experimental Analysis”

16.30 **Neue Nationalgalerie Private Tour**

19.00 *Conference Dinner. By Invitation Only*

Friday, July 14, 2023

9.30–10.40 1st Session: Chair: tba

Timm Opitz (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition):

[Everyone Likes to be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets](#)

Peter Troyan (University of Virginia):


“Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment”

10.40–11.10 Coffee Break

11.10–12.55 2nd Session: Chair: tba

Anna Bogomolnaia (University of Glasgow):

“The competitive solution to congested assignment”



Christian Basteck (WZB):

“On the Constrained Efficiency of Strategy-proof Random Assignment”

Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal):

“Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets”

12.55–13.45 *Lunch Break*

13.45–15.30 **3rd Session: Chair: tba**

Ran Shorrer (Penn State):
“tba”

Li Chen (University of Gothenburg):

[Respecting Priorities Versus Respecting Preferences in School Choice: When is There a Trade-off?](#)

Inacio Bo (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China):
“tba”

15.30–16.00 Coffee Break

16.00–17.45 **4th Session: Chair: tba**

Aytek Erdil (University of Cambridge):

[Widening Access in University Admissions](#)

Irene Lo (Stanford University):

“Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District”

Rustamdjan Hakimov (University of Lausanne):

[Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention](#)

17.45–17.50 **Closing Remarks**

18.00 *Informal Dinner. By Invitation Only*

(Changes updated May 15)

